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PATRON DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY
IN THE CASINO INDUSTRY:
A CASE FOR A U.S. DATA
PRIVACY STATUTE
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INTRODUCTION
An excited man by the name of Joe eagerly awaits his plane’s arrival to
Las Vegas, Nevada, arguably, the gambling and adult entertainment capital of
the world. Once the plane arrives, Joe is reunited with his long-time friends and
heads straight to the famed Las Vegas Strip to gamble, eat, drink, and be merry.
Joe finds himself at a blackjack table and is asked by the dealer if he has a
player’s card. Joe tells him, “No,” and the dealer informs him that he may
receive comps1 based on his play and other promotional offers if he signs up at
the nearby booth. Joe heads to the booth and signs up for a player’s card. The
booth representative asks for his driver’s license and sets up his account. He is
provided an embossed player’s card with his name and player’s card account
number.
What information has Joe provided the casino? He presented his state-
issued driver’s license, and casinos commonly associate a player’s card account
with the following information: name, date of birth, home address, email
address,2 gender, driver’s license number, the driver’s license issuance and
expiration date, and if provided on the patron’s form of identification, his
Social Security number.3 However, the amount of Joe’s personal information
collected does not stop there. When Joe sits back down to play blackjack, the
amount he wagers and how long he plays is tracked and recorded through his
newly established player’s card account.
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resources provided to me by the Caesars Legal department. I would like to thank the
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1 A comp is also known as a complimentary and signifies something given without charge.
2 ROBERT L. SHOOK, JACKPOT! HARRAH’S WINNING SECRETS FOR CUSTOMER LOYALTY 228
(2003); Interview with Mike Effner, Information Technology Director, Western Division,
Caesars Entertainment Corp., in Las Vegas, Nev. (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Effner
Interview].
3 Effner Interview, supra note 2.
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Any additional information the casino obtains about Joe will also be
linked to his player’s card account; for example, if Joe requests a credit line
through the casino, decides to play the slot machines, dines at one of the
casino’s restaurants, or occupies a room in the casino’s hotel, all of the infor-
mation will be tracked through his player’s card.4 Thus, by the time Joe is
ready to depart Las Vegas and head home, enough information will be com-
piled on him to build a detailed profile of his gambling habits, a plan to incen-
tivize his return, and an individual profit-and-loss projection by which the
casino may gauge its future marketing investment in Joe.
Player tracking by casinos allows a value to be placed on a customer by
forecasting repeat sales earned by the casino based on the assumption the cus-
tomer will be loyal and continue gambling at the casino in the future.5 Thus,
casino marketing personnel use the data on Joe to make personalized marketing
decisions on providing Joe comps and deciding what type of offers Joe will
most favorably respond to based on his tracked gaming and non-gaming
behavior.
Joe is not the only guest to receive such specialized attention. More than
one in ten Americans holds a casino player’s card.6 Because of the large num-
ber of individuals using these player’s cards and the vast amount of personal
information possessed by casinos regarding these patrons, one might be con-
cerned about the risks associated with these types of player tracking systems.
What are the risks associated with obtaining, tracking, and maintaining such a
large amount of data on millions of casino patrons? This Note will discuss the
risks and potential costs to a casino and its patrons if personal information
stored on a player tracking system is hacked and used by an unauthorized user
to the detriment of casino patrons.
The development of information privacy law is significantly influenced by
the progression of technology.7 Over the years, information privacy has
become known as one of the prevailing issues of our time.8 In the United States
today, there are hundreds of laws regarding privacy: “the common law torts,
criminal law, evidentiary privileges, constitutional law, at least twenty federal
statutes, and numerous state statutory laws across the fifty states.”9 Many times
the development of new technology leads to more laws intended to address the
increased risks associated with the collection, dissemination, and use of per-
sonal information.10 In the casino industry, the current need for U.S. federal
legislation regarding casino patron data security has arisen as breaches in secur-
ity and the risk of exposure to information that personally identifies individuals
have increased.11
4 Id.; SHOOK, supra note 2, at 228-29.
5 SHOOK, supra note 2, at 227.
6 Missouri . . . Be Aware, CASINO WATCH, http://casinowatch.org/harrahs_patents/harrahs_
patents_1.html, (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
7 Christopher Wolf, Proskauer on Privacy: A Guide to Privacy and Data Security Law in
the Information Age, 16827 P.L.I. CORP. & SEC. LAW LIBRARY, 1-3 (August 2008).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See Industry Notice from Randall E. Sayre, Member, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., to All
Non-restricted Licensees Who Maintain Personal And/Or Financial Information of Patrons
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The availability of personal data has increased dramatically with the ever-
growing dominance of Internet and technology-fueled activities since the mid-
1990s.12 Due to improvements in technology and decreasing costs of process-
ing and storage, data are exchanged without ever providing notice or trans-
parency about the handling and storage of such information to those individuals
whose personal data are involved.13 Moreover, those entities that aggregate and
maintain personal information in databases enjoy limited responsibility and
accountability to individual patrons because of limited procedural protec-
tions.14 Very few Americans realize that everyday commercial transactions dis-
perse their personal information into the stream of commerce; including
transactions such as purchases, subscriptions, and loyalty program member-
ships.15 Even fewer Americans realize that once this data is stored, it exists
forever.16
This Note will discuss the recent surge in patron data collected by casino
player tracking systems and the increasing need to protect the confidentiality
and security of patron Personally Identifiable Information (PII) through the
implementation of federal privacy legislation. Part I discusses the rise of the
casino player tracking database systems. Part II explains and defines PII. Part
III outlines current U.S. privacy laws applicable to the casino industry,
describes casino liability standards, and examines patron remedies for a poten-
tial breach in the security of patron PII. Part IV assesses the strengths and
weaknesses of U.S. privacy laws applicable to the casino industry, compares
those laws to European and Canadian data security laws, and describes how the
application of international privacy law in the U.S. will improve the current
casino industry data security laws. Finally, Part V suggests that the current
industry-based U.S. privacy laws are ineffective, and a nationwide standard, as
exemplified in European and Canadian privacy law, should be implemented in
the U.S. to ensure appropriate patron PII data security in the U.S. casino
industry.
I. THE RISE OF CASINO PLAYER TRACKING - PATRON DATABASE SYSTEMS
The modern day era of database-driven information systems began in the
1970s.17 In his 1971 book, The Assault on Privacy, Arthur R. Miller advised,
“[T]he new information technologies seem to have given birth to a new social
virus–’data-mania’ . . . [and] . . . we must begin to realize what it means to live
in a society that treats information as an economically desirable commodity and
a source of power.”18 Technology’s fast pace evolution has driven the creation
in a Computerized Database and Interested Persons, (Dec. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Industry
Notice], available at http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/industry_ltr_252.pdf.
12 Candice L. Kline, Comment, Security Theater and Database-Driven Information Mar-
kets: A Case for an Ominbus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 448 (2007).
13 Id. at 448-49.
14 Id. at 449.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 447.
18 Id.
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of the information systems.19 Technology has allowed credit card companies
and retailers to track personal data on most Americans to profile spending char-
acteristics;20 the casino industry is no different.
The future success and growth of casinos relies on those in the industry
who embrace and encourage cutting-edge technology to improve customer ser-
vice. Consequently, a sweeping new database industry emerged with the
improved ability of casino corporations to develop sophisticated databases that
capture, organize, and analyze growing amounts of individual personal data.21
As computer technology continues to develop, the sophistication of casino loy-
alty programs also continue to grow.22 Toward the late 1990s, casino corpora-
tions learned to link and share patron wagering data among multiple “sister
properties” using a single patron loyalty program account.23 By doing so, the
technologically advanced system allowed casino patrons gambling at various
properties owned by one casino corporation to accumulate all earned rewards
on a single loyalty card.24
Innovation and precision in both tactical and strategic measures have
become more sophisticated, allowing offers to be closely tailored to customer
preferences.25 Casinos no longer capture information simply for casino market-
ing purposes; rather, the information is captured for eventual use by all of a
casino’s employees, enabling them to perform their jobs more effectively.26
However, access to customer data should generally be limited based on an
employee’s position and relative need for customer information.27 The follow-
ing section discusses the technological development and current use of casino
player tracking database systems in the casino industry.
A. Harrah’s Entertainment28: Total Rewards Player Tracking Program
In the late 1990s, technology and innovative marketing strategies rapidly
changed how Harrah’s Entertainment operated its casinos.29 Harrah’s began its
Total Gold program in 1997.30 The program was operated by a computerized
database system, which recorded patron gambling activity and offered rewards
to patrons based on their level of play at all Harrah’s casino gaming locations.31
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Kline, supra note 12, at 447.
22 Edward McKinley, Betting on Better Customer Information, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Apr.
2005, at 46, 46 (the big resort-casino chains have stacked the odds in their favor by using
loyalty club cards to record every chip wagered at the gaming tables and every coin fed into
the slot machines).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. changed its official company name to Caesars Entertainment
Corporation in November 2010.
29 Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the
New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 15, 70 (2007) (explaining the
history behind the Harrah’s Entertainment patron loyalty program).
30 Id.
31 Id.
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When Gary Loveman joined Harrah’s in 1998 as its chief operating officer, the
Harrah’s system of tracking and rewarding patrons elevated to a new level of
sophistication.32 Loveman remodeled the Total Gold program from “a cus-
tomer-recognition rewards program” to the “Total Rewards” program, which he
described as “a loyalty program” that created “loyalty incentives” for customers
to conduct a significant amount of their gaming at Harrah’s properties.33
As the number of casinos under Harrah’s ownership and management con-
tinued to grow, and the number of patrons rose, Loveman felt that in order to
compete effectively in the gaming industry, it was important for Harrah’s to
reexamine its comping procedures.34 With this in mind, the Total Rewards pro-
gram began collecting the following information about each patron: age, gen-
der, home address, gaming habits and history, and their consumption
preferences-for restaurants, hotel accommodations, spa treatments, golf, and
other such amenities.35 In doing so, control over patron information was pro-
vided at the corporate level and taken away from employees.36 This approach
to comping patrons permitted Harrah’s to provide individualized incentives and
rewards to customers at all levels of play and at all affiliated properties.37
The reward points that casino patrons earn through their gaming and non-
gaming activity may be used for complimentary food, rooms, and entertainment
at any Harrah’s affiliated property.38 These complimentary reward points are
available to gamblers at all levels of wagering, not simply the high rollers, as
was customarily granted by the casino.39 In 2001, more than half of the revenue
earned by Harrah’s Las Vegas came from patrons participating in the Total
Rewards program.40 The CEO and President of Harrah’s Entertainment, Gary
Loveman, stated in an interview in 2003:
We . . . collect a tremendous amount of information on what players do with us. We
know when you arrive at a casino, what you do there, and when you leave. We have
information on 26 million customers. And we measure everything . . . . We have the
capacity to know rather than guess at something because we collect so much infor-
mation about our customers.41
Harrah’s has been enormously successful in its marketing and operating
strategies. The Harrah’s customer database grew from 5.3 million customers in
1995, to 23 million patrons in 2000, and 26.6 million patrons in 2002.42 The
year-end 2009 figures released by Harrah’s Entertainment boasted more than
32 Id. at 71.
33 Id. at 72.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 73.
38 Richard McGowan & Timothy Brown, Revenue Generation at Casino Resorts: The Use
of “Comp-Based” Promotions, 13 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 363, 365 (2009).
39 Id.
40 Id. (citing Mike Beirne, Dollars in the Desert, BRANDWEEK, Apr. 1, 2002, at 19-20).
41 Avery & Crain, supra note 29, at 74 (quoting Interview by David O. Becker with Gary
Loveman, CEO, Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc.).
42 Id. at 72.
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40 million Total Rewards members in the loyalty program.43 Additionally, in
2010, 74% of total gaming revenues and 58% of cross-market play44 came
from tracked play45 in the twenty-eight Harrah’s-owned casinos throughout
twelve states.46 The corporation’s investment in its patented Total Rewards
program has given it a significant competitive advantage in the gaming indus-
try.47 However, as the years passed from its initial implementation, other casi-
nos have taken advantage of integrating similar multi-property player tracking
systems to collect, track, and retain data on casino patrons.
B. MGM Resorts International: M life Players Club
In 2002, MGM Resorts International consolidated seventeen property-
based loyalty programs by consolidating sixteen databases into a single entity
called “The Players Club.”48 Before 2002, however, each MGM-owned casino
offered two or three separate patron loyalty programs, conceivably one with
points for slot-machine play, another for complimentary plays on table games,
and a third with perks for high rollers.49 Each of MGM’s prior Players Club
patron accounts built loyalty to one casino, however, none encouraged loyalty
to the MGM brand universally because points accumulated at one casino prop-
erty did not transfer to another.50
Consequently, MGM created a centralized MGM Players Club.51 With the
integration and centralization of MGM’s initial property-based player’s club
accounts in 2002, a gambler could earn points or comps at Bellagio and present
his or her player’s club card at Luxor.52 The company-wide information would
pop up on a computer screen at Luxor, and the staff would recognize the
patron’s spending at a sister property and respond accordingly by offering
rewards and providing increased hospitality service.53 In April 2002, the MGM
Player’s Club patron database included more than 20 million names.54
More recently, MGM Resorts International has re-launched its Players
Club loyalty program as M life Players Club.55 The revamped program uses
technology that is more refined and allows M life Players Club members to
43 Caesars Entm’t, Investor Presentation, Mar. 25, 2011, at 8, available at http://media.
corporate-ir.net/Media_Files/IROL/84/84772/Caesars_Investor_Presentation.pdf.
44 Cross-market play signifies a casino patron’s gaming activities in sister properties across
varying regional casino markets.
45 Caesars Entm’t, supra note 43, at 9.
46 McKinley, supra note 22.
47 Avery & Crain, supra note 29, at 76.
48 McKinley, supra note 22.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See Missouri . . . Be Aware, supra note 6 (citing Joe Weinert, Casinos Urged to Embrace
Technology, THE PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Nov 15, 2002).
52 McKinley, supra note 22.
53 Id. at 46-48.
54 Missouri . . . Be Aware, supra note 6 (citing Joe Weinert, Casinos Urged to Embrace
Technology, THE PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Nov. 15, 2002).
55 Amanda Finnegan, MGM Resorts Launches M Life Rewards Program, Will Track Non-
gaming Spending, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 11, 2011, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/
news/2011/jan/11/mgm-resorts-launches-m-life-rewards-program-will-t/.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\3-1\NVG107.txt unknown Seq: 7  6-JUN-12 10:59
Spring 2012] PATRON DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY 87
customize their engagement with the program.56 The program provides incen-
tives to its players by utilizing a tiered system that rewards players with greater
benefits the more they gamble and engage with the company’s brands.57 The M
life rewards program launched in January 2011, but currently only tracks cus-
tomer spending on the casino floor.58 However, the company looks to begin the
tracking of non-gaming patron expenditures by late 2011.59
C. Other Casino Player Tracking Database Systems
Other casinos have also implemented some form of a patron database sys-
tem, including Sands Corporation, Boyd Gaming Corporation, Station Casinos,
and Herbst Gaming.60 On June 28, 2010, Boyd Gaming Corporation launched a
nationwide, multi-property player loyalty program under the brand “B Con-
nected.”61 The single brand provides more consistent rules and greater ease of
use, which enables patrons to earn benefits as the program integrates a patron’s
accumulated points from all Boyd Gaming affiliated casino properties.62 In
April 1999, Station Casinos initiated its patron loyalty “Boarding Pass” pro-
gram, which merges and links patron information for all eight Las Vegas-based
Station Casinos properties on one Boarding Pass player’s card account.63 Thus,
a patron may earn and spend Boarding Pass reward points at any of the Station
Casinos properties.64
The varying casino patron loyalty programs are all based fundamentally
on the same source of information: patron PII data. The information collected
by casinos on patrons consists of the patron’s name, gender, date of birth, home
address, email address, driver’s license or passport information, gaming and (at
some casinos) non-gaming activity.65 Additionally, the patron’s personal infor-
mation may be aggregated with other information acquired and maintained by
the casino.66 For example, a patron’s financial credit history with the casino,
any suspicious gambling activity by the patron, and the comp value or points
balance earned by the patron on their loyalty card may be assessed for market-
ing analysis or other investigative purposes.67
Surely, many patrons would expect the casino to retain and protect loyalty
card complimentary values or point balances. However, patron loyalty card
56 New Players Club for MGM Resorts International, CASINO GAMING STOCK (June 18,
2010), http://www.casinogamingstock.net/news/new-players-club-for-mgm-resorts-interna-
tional-mgm-903166.
57 Id.
58 Finnegan, supra note 55.
59 Id.
60 Las Vegas Players Club Card – Casino Sign Up List, LAS VEGAS- THE HOW TO GUIDE,
http://www.lasvegas-how-to.com/players-club-card-list.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
61 Boyd Gaming, Boyd Gaming’s ‘B Connected’ Players Club Goes Nationwide – Casinos
Giving Away Millions to Celebrate Rollout, PR NEWSWIRE (Jun. 28, 2010), http://boydgam-
ing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=58.
62 Id.
63 How to get Station Casinos Boarding Pass, LAS VEGAS- THE HOW TO GUIDE, http://
www.lasvegas-how-to.com/station-casino-players-club.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
64 Id.
65 SHOOK, supra note 2, at 228-29; Effner Interview, supra note 2.
66 Effner Interview, supra note 2.
67 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\3-1\NVG107.txt unknown Seq: 8  6-JUN-12 10:59
88 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:81
information, linked and available with the patron’s personal information and
gaming history, may provide external hackers or dishonest casino employees
the ability to use the patron’s personal information to the detriment of the
patron and casino.68 Thus, exposure of patron information may lead to fraudu-
lent redemptions of a patron’s earned rewards or comps, potential identity theft,
or unwanted public exposure of the patron’s gaming activity or other personal
information.69 The casino may also suffer negative publicity, patron distrust,
loss of business, or legal liability.70
II. PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII)
Unauthorized access, use, or disclosure of personally identifiable informa-
tion (PII) on computer systems, storage media, or in physical paper form can
seriously harm both parties involved.71 The individual may suffer from identity
theft, blackmail, or embarrassment, while the organization (e.g., casino corpo-
ration) may suffer from a reduction in public trust or legal liability.72 As sensi-
tive information is stored and shared in electronic, verbal, and paper form,
safeguards are needed to address the security of data classification, handling,
storage, and disposal.73
One example of the danger posed by stolen PII occurred in May 2006
when a U.S. Veterans Affairs Department laptop was stolen from a private
residence.74 The laptop contained 26.5 million personal records for military
veterans and a significant number of their spouses’ information, including
names, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth.75 The incident concerned
both lawmakers and citizens alike.76 According to a government official’s
statement, “the theft was an unprecedented loss of personal information . . .
[P]ersonal information can include your financial data, your medical data, and,
basically, your virtual identity. All valuable data could easily lead to identity
theft and no one seems safe.”77
A. Identifying PII
Personal information does not include any publicly available information
that may be legally obtained by the public from any federal, state, or local
68 Interview with Jerry Markling, Chief of Enforcement Div., Nevada Gaming Control Bd.,
in Las Vegas, Nev. (Oct. 18, 2010).
69 Id.; Effner Interview, supra note 2.
70 Effner Interview, supra note 2.
71 MCCALLISTER ET AL., GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII), 2-1 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, NIST Special Publ’n 800-
122, April 2010), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-
122.pdf; see also MICHAEL METZLER & PAUL HARKER, PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFOR-
MATION (PII): A WHITE PAPER ON INFORMATION SECURITY, 3 (Version 1.6, Revised August
2008) available at www.savvis.net.
72 MCCALLISTER ET AL., supra note 71, at 2-1.
73 Id.
74 MELTZER & HARKER, supra note 71, at 3.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. (quoting L. Wilbanks, The Impact of Personally Identifiable Information, IT Profes-
sional, 9 (4), 62-64, 2007).
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government records or widely distributed media.78 The following list contains
examples of qualified PII, subject to heightened protective security measures:
• Name, such as full name, maiden name, mother’s maiden name or alias;
• Personal identification number, such as Social Security Number (SSN), passport
number, driver’s license number, taxpayer identification number, and financial
account or credit card number;79
• Address information, such as street address or email address,
• Asset information, such as Internet Protocol (IP) or Media Access Control (MAC)
address or other host-specific persistent static identifier that consistently links to a
particular person or small, well-defined group of people;
• Telephone numbers, including mobile, business, and personal numbers;
• Personal characteristics, including photographic image (especially of face or other
distinguishing characteristics), x-rays, fingerprints, or other biometric image or
template data (e.g., retina scan, voice signature, facial geometry);
• Information about an individual that is linked or linkable to one of the above (e.g.,
date of birth, place of birth, race, religion, weight, activities, geographical indica-
tors, employment information, medical information, education information, finan-
cial information).80
PII is treated differently from publicly available data because it needs to
be collected, maintained, and disseminated in accordance with applicable fed-
eral and state laws.81 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (“OECD”) Privacy Guidelines are the most commonly accepted
privacy principles in the world.82 The Privacy Guidelines were endorsed by the
United States Department of Commerce in 1981.83 The OECD Fair Informa-
tion Practices have guided privacy law and policy initiatives in many other
countries as well, including Sweden, Australia, and Belgium.84 The OECD
identified the following Fair Information Practices:
• Collection Limitation – There should be limits to the collection of personal data,
and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appro-
priate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
• Data Quality – Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they
are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate,
complete and kept up-to-date.
• Purpose Specification – The purposes for which personal data are collected
should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent
use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompat-
ible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change or
purpose.
• Use Limitation – Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or other-
wise used for purposes other than those specified, except with the consent of the
data subject or by the authority of law.
78 Id.
79 Partial identifiers, such as the first few digits or the last few digits of SSNs, are almost
always considered to fall under the category of PII because they may also be used to identify
a specific individual.
80 MCCALLISTER ET AL., supra note 71, at 2-2.
81 Id. at 2-3.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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• Security Safeguards – Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure of data.
• Openness – There should be a general policy of openness about developments,
practices, and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily
available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main
purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data
controller.
• Individual Participation – An individual should have the right: (a) to obtain
from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data con-
troller has data relating to him; (b) to have communicated to him, data relating to
him within a reasonable time; at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a rea-
sonable manner; and in a form that is readily intelligible to him; (c) to be given
reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be
able to challenge such denial; and (d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the
challenge is successful, to have the data erased, rectified, completed, or amended.
• Accountability – A data controller should be accountable for complying with
measures, which give effect to the principles stated above.85
Effective privacy standards must expand beyond statutorily required pro-
tections and confidentiality of PII.86 To establish a comprehensive privacy pro-
gram, corporations must consider a broad variety of privacy issues and must
understand the risks they will face.87 Policies and procedures should be imple-
mented by Congress to address the Fair Information Practices identified by the
OECD.88
B. Patron PII Confidentiality and Assessing the Risk of a Database Breach
A casino corporation will lower the level of risk posed by possessing
patron PII by improving the confidentiality and security of the information
maintained in its player database systems. The potential harm to an individual
patron includes a multitude of negative and unwanted effects (i.e., that may be
socially, physically, or financially damaging), such as blackmail, identity theft,
physical harm, discrimination, or emotional distress.89 Casino corporations will
likely experience harm in the form of, but not limited to, administrative bur-
dens, financial losses, loss of public reputation and public confidence, and legal
liability.90
In terms of individual patron harm, some PII is easily used to identify
specific individuals, while other forms of PII are less likely to identify specific
individuals.91 For example, a database of PII consisting of individuals’ names,
patron account numbers, or Social Security numbers can be used to identify an
individual instantly.92 In contrast, PII data exclusively made up of individuals’
ZIP codes and dates of birth can only indirectly identify individuals or greatly
85 Id. at 2-3 to -4.
86 Id. at 2-4.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 3-1 to -2.
90 Id. at 3-2.
91 Id. at 3-3.
92 Id.
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reduce a large dataset in an attempt to identify a particular individual.93 Simi-
larly, data comprised of only individuals’ area codes and genders would be
unlikely to provide any direct or indirect association to a particular individual
depending upon the context and sample size.94 PII that is uniquely and directly
identifiable presents a higher risk to a casino corporation and poses a greater
threat to an individual patron, compared to PII that is not directly identifiable.95
Thus, casinos should make a concerted effort to identify patrons without using
patrons’ names or other readily identifiable information. However, if casinos do
identify patrons using PII, a comprehensive privacy program should be in place
to protect against identity theft.
A casino organization must defend against identity thieves from within
and outside the confines of the organization.96 The development and mainte-
nance of large databases holding PII requires casinos to employ highly princi-
pled individuals.97 The larger a database, the more vulnerable it is to attack,
and the more trusted individuals are required to maintain it.98 Principled
employees and 24-hour data surveillance monitoring procedures are necessary
to ensure security measures are not breached and PII data is not stolen, resold,
or misused.99
Unfortunately, security breaches by employees or sub-contractors who
have passwords or access to the system have been common.100 Therefore, as
these vulnerable and increasingly valuable databases continue to grow, security
procedures and related technologies must likewise develop to deter theft and
unlawful manipulation of PII by employees, sub-contractors, or external hack-
ers alike.101 There are more opportunities for the confidentiality of PII to be
compromised when it is readily accessible by more people and multiple sys-
tems.102 Amassing large databases creates inherent vulnerabilities that attract
hackers because a successful breach can prove to be both efficient and
lucrative.103
Casinos must also protect PII data when third-party vendors, sub-contrac-
tors, or other systems, such as web applications, outside the direct control of the
casino corporation access the PII maintained by a casino.104 In addition, a
casino might be taking an increased risk should it choose to store or regularly
transport PII data off its premises because the casino lacks the ability to ensure
93 Id. (referencing a MIT study showing 97% of the names and address on a voting list were
identifiable using only ZIP code and date of birth. L. Sweeney, Computational Disclosure
Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection (May 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Mass. Inst. of Tech.) (as cited in Am. Statistical Ass’n, Data Access and Personal Privacy:
Appropriate Methods of Disclosure Control (Dec. 6, 2008), available at http://www.amstat.
org/news/statementondataaccess.cfm.); see also Effner Interview, supra note 2.
94 MCCALLISTER ET AL., supra note 71, at 3-3.
95 Id.
96 Kline, supra note 12, at 455.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 MCCALLISTER ET AL., supra note 71, at 3-5.
103 Kline, supra note 12, at 455.
104 MCCALLISTER ET AL., supra note 71, at 3-5.
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the information is securely stored at all times.105 PII data stored on a corpora-
tion’s property, within its secured physical boundaries, is less likely to be lost
or stolen than similar data stored and maintained offsite.106
Another security problem in existing and newly formulated large database
systems is the complexity and unpredictability of system designs.107 As one
security expert noted, “complexity is the worst enemy of security.”108 Large
databases are difficult to secure because they are generally maintained in a
disorderly mode and therefore are more unpredictable and more susceptible to
catastrophic failures.109 The number of records breached may have varying
consequences, not only in terms of the collective harm to individuals, but also
in terms of harm to the casino corporation’s reputation.110 The cost to the cor-
poration that fails to address and prevent such data breaches can be enormous
and irreversible. The following section illustrates several ways in which a
casino can protect itself from security breaches.
C. PII Confidentiality Safeguards
PII can be protected through multiple procedures, including operational
defenses, specific information technology safeguards, and security controls.111
In addition, employee awareness, training, and education are critical measures
that can serve to reinforce desired PII security practices and ensure the success
of an organization’s privacy and security programs.112 With the recent increase
in PII data breaches, a growing number of federal and state regulations now
require businesses, private organizations, and government agencies that handle
personal information on individuals (such as employees or customers) to imple-
ment security practices to protect PII and related sensitive data.113 Failure to
apply reasonably adequate measures to deter a potential breach in PII data
places an organization at risk of negative publicity, reputational damages, loss
of customer or employee trust, potential litigation, and a possibility of bank-
ruptcy or closure.114
Most organizations are required to protect PII through application of fed-
eral laws, regulations, and other mandated prevailing procedures.115 Violation
of applicable federal or state legislation can result in civil or criminal penalties
against organizations,116 including casino corporations. Additionally, many
casino corporations are obligated through their own policies, standards, or man-
agement directives to protect patrons’ PII.117 Although these mandated mea-
sures provide some level of PII data protection, the U.S. does not currently
105 Id.
106 Id.; see also, e.g. Effner Interview, supra note 2.
107 Kline, supra note 12, at 455.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 455-56.
110 MCCALLISTER ET AL., supra note 71, at 3-3.
111 Id. at 4-1.
112 Id. at 4-2.
113 MELTZER & HARKER, supra note 71, at 3.
114 Id.
115 MCCALLISTER ET AL., supra note 71, at 3-4.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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have a nationwide data privacy regulation for casino corporations to follow
regarding PII confidentiality standards.118
III. U.S. CASE LAW & REGULATIONS REGARDING PRIVACY: POTENTIAL
CASINO LIABILITY AND PATRON REMEDIES FOR A BREACH IN THE
PLAYER TRACKING SYSTEM
Patron information is crucial to the success and evolution of innovative
products and services as the economy continues to become ever more digital
and innovative every day.119 The use of this information allows patrons to
receive personalized offers tailored to their liking.120 Many companies utilize
safety measures to ensure the protection of consumer information; however,
some do not.121 Not only must the industry as a whole do better, but also pri-
vacy should be a basic consideration for every business, similar to other essen-
tial business practices.122 The following study illustrates how the careless
treatment of consumer information poses a serious threat and requires a com-
prehensive U.S. law to provide a fundamental structure for businesses to
advance individual privacy interests.123
According to a 2008 benchmark study, the costs associated with data
breaches in the U.S. continue to escalate.124 The Fourth Annual U.S. Cost of
Data Breach Study (“Study”) reported the average cost of a data breach
increased from $138 per individual record lost or stolen in 2005 to $202 in
2008.125 In addition, more than 250 million customer records containing confi-
dential personal information have been lost or stolen since 2005.126
The Study reviewed forty-three U.S. companies that experienced a breach
involving the loss or theft of individual customer or consumer data in 2008.127
Each of the companies reviewed experienced a data breach associated with the
loss or theft of 4,200 to 113,000 records.128 The estimated cost in each instance
ranged from a minimum of $613,000 to a maximum of $32 million, providing
an average cost of $6.65 million per company affected.129 The Study found that
as the number of individual data records compromised increased, the cost of the
data breach to the company proportionally grew as well.130 Additional facts
noted by the Study included the following:
118 See id.
119 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS, i, (Dec. 2010).
120 Id. at ii.
121 Id. at i.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 S. Montaye Sigmon, 2008: Study: Cost of Data Breaches Continues to Rise, PRIVACY
L. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2009, 1:00 PM), http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2009/02/articles/data-
breaches/2008-study-cost-of-data-breaches-continues-to-rise/.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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• Approximately 35% of all data breach incidents involved lost or stolen laptop
computers or other mobile data devices;
• More than 88% of all cases in the 2008 Study involved insider negligence;
• Data breaches involving malicious acts are more expensive than breaches involv-
ing negligent acts, costing some $26 more per customer record; and
• First-time data breaches are more expensive than subsequent breaches, costing
some $243 per customer record versus $199 per customer record for companies
that have experienced previous data breaches.131
The problems associated with identity theft are similar to those concerning
database-driven information systems.132 As data breaches and identity theft
risks continue to increase, the American public will likely convey greater con-
cerns regarding PII data privacy.133 These concerns can be primarily traced to
the inadequate privacy protection laws in the United States.134 In 2002 and
2003, approximately ten million Americans were victims of identity theft,
resulting in estimated costs of $53 billion.135 Identity theft has been the most
common complaint received by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), total-
ing 39% of all complaints in 2004 and 36% in 2006.136 When a problem such
as identity theft becomes so prevalent in society, the issue of legal protections
for personal data privacy becomes even more pressing.137
The following section discusses federal and state U.S. privacy laws appli-
cable to the casino industry and its security measures surrounding collection,
maintenance, and use of patron database systems. The current case law regard-
ing security data breaches and identity theft in non-casino based organizations
is reviewed to compare similar potential harms to the casino industry, specifi-
cally to those patrons whose data resides in casino player database systems.
A. Federal Privacy Case Law & Regulations
The United States has long sustained an industry-specific approach toward
privacy of personal information, relying on a patchwork application of federal
and state laws.138 The U.S. courts have done little to define PII and promote
comprehensible laws regarding data privacy in the public and private sector.
Regardless of purpose or intent, courts have rarely intervened to protect indi-
viduals once data has been released to third parties.139 These courts are gener-
ally complacent and deferential to the construction and operation of
information databases.140 Similarly, substantive law procedures and standards
applicable to the right to privacy provide limited personal data protections and
inadequately address the complex nature of modern data privacy issues.141
131 Id.
132 Kline, supra note 12, at 458.
133 Id. at 457.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 458.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 457-58.
138 See Ariane Siegel et al., Survey of Privacy Law Developments in 2009: United States,
Canada, and the European Union, 65 BUS. LAW. 285, 287 (2009).
139 Kline, supra note 12, at 458.
140 Id.
141 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\3-1\NVG107.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-JUN-12 10:59
Spring 2012] PATRON DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY 95
Casino patrons have few means to protect themselves effectively from
identity theft crimes. All of the information held on the casino player database
systems is potentially at risk.142 Identity thieves and other criminals recognize
casino patron database systems are lucrative targets because of the vast
amounts of personal data maintained on a central database system.143 They
recognize the limitations in database-driven information markets and take
advantage of several factors: “(1) lack of individual control of personal data,
(2) third-party dominance, (3) an inability to seek adequate legal remedies, and
(4) a complete lack of transparency on data use.”144 These shortfalls in data
privacy show the need for legal remedies to address data security risks and for
other methods of encouraging responsible database management practices.145
The modern third-party problem in database-driven information systems
does not comport with the traditional form of rival relationships (in litiga-
tion).146 This is primarily because an individual’s right to privacy under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution are not held to apply to
third-party data disclosures because of weak interpretations by American
courts.147 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court requires both “subjective and
objective expectations of privacy” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, creat-
ing a narrow view of the right to privacy.148 The Court has found there is no
finding of either subjective or objective privacy once an individual releases his
information into the stream of commerce.149 Also, efforts by a plaintiff to
amass a privacy-based tort case are generally held ineffective against the strong
protections of the First Amendment, which often weigh in favor of third-party
commercial or publication interests.150 Therefore, U.S. constitutional law offers
little protection to those individuals seeking a right to data privacy,151 including
those patrons voluntarily disclosing personal information to a casino in return
for obtaining a player’s card.
Similarly, judicial deference to the markets and its promotion of individual
choice in commercial transactions limits individual data privacy rights availa-
ble through contract and property law.152 Under these principles, any applica-
ble regulation on the free trade of personal data would require statutory
formation.153 However, legislative actions have provided limited legal protec-
tion in the data privacy domain based on inconsistency and lack of form.154
These legislative problems highlight an essential issue with United States data
142 Chris Sieroty, Casinos Cautioned to restrict access to player card information, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.lvrj.com/business/casinos-cautioned-to-restrict-
access-to-player-card-information-114193164.html.
143 See id.
144 Kline, supra note 12, at 458.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 458-59.
151 Id. at 459.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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privacy law: the lack of an omnibus data privacy statute.155 As noted, the judi-
cial deference given to privacy issues furthers the gap in security over personal
data by allowing minimal judicial oversight of personal data use and allowing
data users to utilize database-driven information markets freely for almost any
commercial, investigative, or other private purpose.156
Although a variety of federal laws relate to identity theft, none include a
private right of action.157 Therefore, plaintiffs seeking damages for alleged
identity theft must look to applicable state law measures.158 Unfortunately,
plaintiffs attempting to seek civil recoveries at the state level have been largely
unsuccessful due to the inherent difficulties in proving actual harm.159 The
courts have accepted the general standard that an alleged increase in risk of
future injury is not an “actual or imminent” injury in cases of identity theft.160
Consequently, the cases brought forward involving identity theft or claims of
negligence and breach of confidentiality have often found that plaintiffs do not
have standing, or the courts have granted summary judgment for failure to
establish the necessary harm and associated damages.161
The applicable laws do not appear to take into account lost opportunities
associated with identity theft when evaluating a plaintiff’s harm.162 Some vic-
tims of identity theft suffer by: having to spend thousands of dollars and years
dealing with credit bureaus and debtors; losing out on job opportunities; being
denied loans for education, housing, or cars because of negative information on
their credit reports; and in rare cases, are arrested for crimes identity theft vic-
tims did not commit.163
The FTC began its efforts to protect consumer privacy at the federal level
in 1970 with the passage of the Federal Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).164 The
FCRA limited the FTC’s review to the regulation of consumer reporting agen-
cies and their use of individuals’ credit-related information.165 The FTC’s pri-
mary source of legal authority derives from Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
empowers the FTC to take action against deceptive or unfair acts or prac-
tices.166 The FTC has applied two primary models in the context of data pri-
vacy law: the “notice-and-choice” and “harm-based” models.167
The “notice-and-choice” model encourages companies to design privacy
notices for consumers describing the process and general procedures regarding
their information collection and use practices, so they may make informed
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Denis T. Rice, Trends in Security and Privacy Breach Litigation: is the Liability
Expanding?, in PRACTICING L. INSTITUTE, 507, 544 (2010).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Brian Krebs, New Federal Law Targets ID Theft, Cybercrime, Security Fix, WASHING-
TON POST (Oct.1, 2008, 4:33 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/
new_federal_law_targets_id_the.html.
163 Id.
164 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 119, at ii.
165 Id. at 3.
166 Id. at 3-4.
167 Id. at iii.
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choices.168 The “harm-based” model focuses on protecting consumers from
specific harms such as physical security, economic injury, and unwanted intru-
sions caused by unforeseen exploitation of their personal data.169 Although
each model has significantly advanced the FTC’s goal of protecting consumer
privacy rights, each model has also received ample criticism.170
The FTC’s “notice-and-choice” model has led to long and nearly incom-
prehensible privacy policies that an average American consumer does not typi-
cally read or even understand.171 Similarly, the “harm-based” model has been
criticized for failing to recognize privacy-related risks and consumer concerns
beyond financial harms, including harm to an individual’s reputation and fears
of being monitored.172 In addition, both models struggle to keep pace with the
speedy rise of technologies and business models that allow companies to col-
lect and utilize individuals’ personal information in a way unknown to the indi-
vidual.173 Meanwhile, industry efforts to enhance privacy through self-
regulation are slow and have failed to provide adequate and meaningful data
privacy protections.174
Beginning in the mid-1990s, in reaction to the passage of new consumer
privacy laws, the FTC began to examine privacy issues beyond the scope of the
FCRA.175 The FTC focused its attention toward enforcing multiple sector-spe-
cific statutes, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) enacted in
1999.176 The primary purpose of the GLBA is to enhance efficiency in the
financial services industry.177 The GLBA allows financial institutions to share
the “nonpublic personal information” within its company sub-parts with no
obligation to restrict the sharing of customer information; however, a company
must notify its customers of any outside information sharing activities it per-
forms.178 Thus, individuals have no right to stop companies from sharing their
personal information when it is shared within the company.179 However, any
information shared by the company with a third party must be disclosed to the
customer, and the customer must be given the right to opt-out of such informa-
tion sharing practices.180
It has been argued that casino corporations may qualify under the GLBA
as a “financial institution.”181 However, the FTC and other federal governmen-
tal entities have not applied the definition of “financial institutions” as codified
in the GLBA to include casino corporations.182 As a result, no federal data
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at iii.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 3.
176 Id. at 4.
177 See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006).
178 Id. at § 6802(a).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Interview with Lisa Mathis, Senior Corporate Counsel, Legal Dep’t, Caesars Entm’t
Corp., in Las Vegas, Nev. (Sept. 16, 2010).
182 Id.
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privacy regulations directly apply to the casino industry regarding the mainte-
nance and security of patron database systems.183
In 2000, the FTC used its authority to bring actions against several non-
gaming companies that engaged in unfair or deceptive information practices.184
Most of the early cases that came before the FTC involved misleading company
statements in privacy notices sent to consumers regarding the collection and
use of their data.185 These cases encouraged the FTC to shift its concern toward
offline data privacy threats and the increasing integration of online and offline
data systems.186 Thus, the FTC’s privacy approach evolved to incorporate spe-
cific consumer harms as the principal means of tackling individual consumer
privacy concerns.187 Instead of applying the costly “notice-and-choice” stan-
dards for all applications of information, the FTC used the “harm-based”
model, focusing on organizational processes that caused, or were likely to
cause, physical or economic harm to individual consumers.188
The “harm-based” model effectively provided individual consumer protec-
tions in a variety of areas, including data security, identity theft, spam, and
other related contexts.189 Further, the FTC has applied its given authority under
multiple statutes (including the FCRA, the GLBA, and Section 5 of the FTCA),
to bring twenty-nine cases against businesses that allegedly failed to protect
consumers’ personal information in 2001.190 The cases brought forth by the
FTC were against well-known, recognized companies, such as Microsoft,
ChoicePoint, TJX, and LexisNexis.191 The companies were alleged to have
failed to, “(1) comply with posted privacy policies, (2) take appropriate steps to
protect against common vulnerabilities, (3) dispose of data properly and (4)
take reasonable steps to ensure that they do not share customer data with unau-
thorized third parties.”192
ChoicePoint, a data broker with more than nineteen billion records on
almost every American, sold personal data in 2005 to identity thieves operating
a fraudulent business.193 The personal data sold included names, addresses, and
Social Security numbers of 163,000 individual records.194 The ramifications of
the ChoicePoint breach resulted in potentially 1,400 cases of identity theft
against the company.195 The breach came to light when ChoicePoint mailed
notification letters to inform only the 30,000 California residents that were
affected, but failed to notify the residents of other states of the situation.196 The
disclosure letters were distributed pursuant to California’s security breach
183 Id.
184 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 119, at 8.
185 Id. at 8-9.
186 Id. at 9.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 10.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 10-11.
193 Kline, supra note 12, at 456.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Wolf, supra note 7, at 1-45.
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notice requirement.197 Soon thereafter, other states’ governing bodies began to
demand their respective state citizens affected receive notification as well.198
ChoicePoint then proceeded to notify all who had been affected throughout the
country.199 As of January 17, 2008, the ChoicePoint 2005 data breach was
estimated to result in the disclosure of more than 217 million records compris-
ing personal data.200
A breach in individual personal data held by an organization may also
result in corporate liability.201 In January 2009, Heartland Payment Systems,
the sixth-largest payment processor in the United States, disclosed that an unde-
termined number of its consumers were exposed to potential fraud due to a
breach in its processing systems.202 The repercussions of the breach came to
surface when more than 625 financial institutions disclosed that their consumer
cards were jeopardized from the Heartland data breach.203 As a result, three
types of class action suits were filed against Heartland.204 Consequently, Heart-
land announced that it would install a complete encryption system in 2009 to
protect its processing network better.205 These events gave renewed awareness
to the ever-increasing concerns and costs associated with identity theft—a
crime that affects an estimated ten million Americans each year.206 However,
the distribution of liability to an organization and the third-party hacker in data
breach cases remains an unsettled area of law.207 It is unclear if a data breach
were to occur in a casino patron database system what, if any, federal laws
would apply. Further, it is uncertain if the federal court system would hold the
casino liable for damages sought by patrons.
B. State Privacy Case Law & Regulations
Over time, states have continued to enact new data privacy and security
legislation to protect their citizens’ PII.208 The majority of states, including
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, New York, and Texas, have
enacted laws that limit business use and disclosure of personal information,
197 Id.;
Any person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computer-
ized data that includes personal information, shall disclose any breach of the security of the
system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident
of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have
been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The disclosure shall be made in the most expedient
time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law
enforcement . . . .
S.B. 1386, codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a).
198 Wolf, supra note 7, at 1-46.
199 Id.
200 Kline, supra note 12, at 457.
201 Siegel et al., supra note 138, at 294.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Wolf, supra note 7, at 1-45.
207 See Jeremy Feigelson & Camille Calman, Liability for the Costs of Phising and Informa-
tion Theft, J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2010, at 1, 22.
208 Siegel et al., supra note 138, at 288.
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especially in the use of Social Security numbers.209 Most states mandate com-
panies to enact and enforce valid security procedures and practices to protect
PII; furthermore, to notify individuals adversely affected by an unlawful breach
of PII held by the company.210 These state laws were enacted in response to
consumer fears of identity theft, heightened by highly publicized data security
breaches taking place across the country.211 The privacy laws largely mirror
California’s first-in-the-nation data security breach notification law; however,
there remain significant differences in the requirements between each of these
state laws.212 Federal legislation, which would set a minimum uniform standard
across all states, has seriously been considered since 2005; however, no action
has been taken.213
California has taken the lead on being one of the most active states to
create measures regarding privacy and protecting its citizens.214 The Security
Breach Information Act, also commonly referred to as S.B. 1386, requires cus-
tomer notification for all security breaches related to personal information; the
law was the first of its kind to be passed in the United States.215 The California
law requires notification to individuals after unauthorized possession of com-
puterized data that “jeopardizes the security, confidentiality, or integrity of per-
sonal information that is maintained by the person or business experiencing the
breach.”216 Additionally, a third-party maintaining data on behalf of an entity
must notify the entity of any data security breach immediately upon discovery
of an occurrence of data breach.217
A California court, ruling under S.B. 1386, found that a plaintiff that had
his PII stolen, had standing to sue.218 In Ruiz v. Gap, Inc.,219 a laptop computer
that held unencrypted personal identification information of 750,000 job appli-
cants was stolen from a Gap processing vendor.220 The Gap notified the appli-
cants whose information was stolen and offered twelve months of free credit
monitoring.221 Ruiz did not register for the free credit monitoring offered by
the Gap; instead, he filed a complaint against the company for negligence.222 A
negligence claim under California law requires the claim be based on “appreci-
able non-speculative, present harm.”223 However, the harm asserted in Ruiz’s
claim was based on a future (rather than present) risk of identity theft.224 Thus,
the court held that an increased risk of identity theft “does not rise to the level
of . . . harm necessary to assert a negligence claim under California law,” and
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Wolf, supra note 7, at 5-26.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 5-3.
215 Id. at 5-26.
216 Id. at 5-26 to -27.
217 Id. at 5-27.
218 Siegel et al., supra note 138, at 294.
219 See 622 F. Supp.2d 908 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
220 Id. at 910; Siegel et al., supra note 138, at 294-95.
221 Siegel et al., supra note 138, at 295.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
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dismissed the case.225 However, the Ruiz finding did endorse a plaintiff’s
standing to sue if his or her PII is stolen and if actual harm is suffered; thus,
potentially exposing business entities to longer and more costly litigation.226
Although most states generally follow California’s breach notification
framework and regard it as adequate, they also include their own derivative
containing subtle distinctions and provisions regarding notification proce-
dures.227 Some go as far as mandating additional measures beyond security
breach notification requirements with the goal of developing a comprehensive
legal standard to deter identity theft.228 Some of the additional legislative mea-
sures include mandating the implementation of procedures to safeguard per-
sonal information, and others specify data destruction requirements.229
Nevada is one of forty-six states that enacted legislation requiring notifica-
tion of security breaches involving personal information.230 Nevada Revised
Statutes (“NRS”) 603A.210 “Security Measures” and NRS 603A.220 “Disclo-
sure of Breach of Security System Data, Methods of Disclosure,” describe in
detail the security measures required by state law.231 In addition, these statutes
discuss required notifications in cases where unauthorized persons access pri-
vate information.232
Nevada Regulation 5.011 provides a list of actions and omissions that may
be considered unsuitable methods of operation; subsection 8 specifically notes
the Nevada Gaming Commission’s discretion to interpret statutes:
Failure to comply with or make provision for compliance with all federal, state and
local laws and regulations pertaining to the operations of a licensed establishment
. . . . The Nevada Gaming Commission in the exercise of its sound discretion can
make its own determination of whether or not the licensee has failed to comply with
the aforementioned, but any such determination shall make use of the established
precedents in interpreting the language of the applicable statutes. Nothing in this
section shall be deemed to affect any right to judicial review.233
The Nevada Gaming Control Board (“Board”) is obligated to ensure gam-
ing is conducted consistent with the State’s public policy and not in a way
“[i]nimical to the public health, safety, good order and general welfare . . . .”234
In addition, Nevada law enables the Board and Nevada Gaming Commission to
consider certain acts or omissions performed by a gaming licensee, which
include a licensee’s non-compliance with all federal, state, and local laws, as
unfit methods of operation.235
The Board issued an industry notice to all non-restricted gaming licensees
who utilize and maintain personal or financial information of patrons in a com-
225 Id. (quoting Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp.2d 908, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009)).
226 See id.
227 Wolf, supra note 7, at 5-29.
228 Id. at 5-45.
229 Id. at 5-45 to -46.
230 Industry Notice, supra note 11.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
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puterized database on December 15, 2010.236 In the notice, the Board acknowl-
edged that particular gaming licensees maintain large databases that contain
casino patron personal or financial information.237 The industry notice was
intended to serve as a reminder to all casino licensees who maintain patron
personal or financial information to conduct periodic reviews of existing secur-
ity measures in place and verify compliance with the security and breach dis-
closure requirements provided in NRS 603A.238
With respect to casino patron database systems, the Board has recently
investigated several incidents where such databases have been maintained, and
the potential for improper disclosure of PII and identity theft existed.239 In
addition, the Board stressed that casinos will almost certainly become an even
greater target for cyber-criminals as more and more information is stored on
these databases.240 Although the Board’s industry notice did not provide details
as to the matters investigated, two recent incidents became public involving the
theft of personal information in Las Vegas, Nevada.241 In July 2010, a hacker
received information about attendees at Cisco Live 2010, a computer industry
event at Mandalay Bay.242 The information stolen, however, was not linked to
Mandalay Bay’s database.243 Similarly, the Desert Rose Resort also reported
that an “unspecified number” of guests at the hotel between June 2010 and
October 2010 had their debit and credit card information stolen by a malicious
software virus.244 These two attacks serve as early warning signs as to the
gravity and invasive nature of cyber-criminal attacks and their ability to acquire
personal information held by casino corporations.245
All businesses face a certain level of inherent threat to maintaining
databases that store personal and financial information.246 Casinos are excep-
tionally professional about the collection and storage of personal information
and generally utilize multiple layers of security to protect the data they hold,
including measures to encrypt the data held.247 Although there are no easy
solutions when it comes to ensuring the safety and security of PII, doing so has
become an inherent cost of business.
A growing number of fraud cases in Las Vegas arise primarily out of point
stealing schemes and involve casino patron database systems and the cards
used by patrons.248 The Enforcement Division of the Board has investigated
multiple instances of patrons’ player’s club points being stolen.249 As the con-
trolling gaming regulatory system in the State of Nevada, the Board has
236 Id.
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reminded casino licensees of their responsibilities to maintain security of cus-
tomer databases.250 All of these threats support the need for stronger safeguards
and regular review of the existing policies and laws in place to ensure compli-
ance and protection of PII from unauthorized access.251 Although Nevada state
legislators have enacted very strict laws regarding customer confidentiality,
other jurisdictions across the country have not.252 As a result, compliance from
multi-jurisdictional businesses, including casino corporations, has been much
more piecemeal and difficult in its application.
IV. MODELS FOR AN OMNIBUS U.S. PRIVACY LAW APPLICABLE TO CASINO
PATRON DATABASE SYSTEMS: THE EU DATA PRIVACY DIRECTIVE
AND CANADIAN PIPEDA
Database-driven information systems contain inherent imperfections and
require adequate regulatory safeguards and monitoring.253 In contrast to the
more piecemeal approach to data privacy in the United States, Canada and the
European Union have adopted a comprehensive umbrella privacy policy that
address the many facets of data collection and storage.254 Comprehensive data
privacy regulations modeled after the European Union Data Protection Direc-
tive (“EU Directive”) and the Canadian Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) are needed in the U.S. to protect indi-
vidual privacy interests. Through greater recognition of individual data privacy
rights, a U.S. data privacy statute could create additional incentives to improve
the accuracy and integrity of casino database-driven information markets, as
well as all U.S. industry information markets, while also ensuring remedial
measures would be available to those individuals whose PII is breached.255
This section explores the right to privacy concept in the U.S. and compares
U.S. data privacy law to Canadian and European Union privacy law.
A. EU Data Protection Directive
The European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (“EU Direc-
tive”) went into effect in October 1998, with the intent to create coordinated
national laws throughout the EU to ensure the movement of personal informa-
tion was protected with respect to the processing of personal information.256
European privacy regulators apply a broad interpretation to the EU Directive
statutory language; thus adopting a very expansive view of the applicable pri-
vacy laws.257 The EU Directive regulates and oversees the “collection, use, and
transfer of individually identifiable personal information about employees and
250 Id.
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252 See Sieroty, supra note 142.
253 Kline, supra note 12, at 443.
254 Siegel et al., supra note 138, at 295, 299.
255 See Kline, supra note 12, at 443.
256 Nixon Peabody, LLP, European Union Data Protection Directive and U.S. Safe Harbor:
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consumers, such as name, address, telephone number, and marital status.”258 In
addition, it also covers information relating to salary, bonuses, terms of an
employment contract, and performance appraisals.259
The U.S. should look to the EU Directive as a useful framework to emu-
late in implementing a nationwide privacy statute that addresses privacy rights
and concerns in database-driven information systems.260 The EU Directive
maintains strict regulations for the processing of individual personal data.261 It
also describes data processing broadly to include almost all database-driven
information system activities as:
[A]ny operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether
or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adap-
tation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemi-
nation or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
destruction.262
The EU Directive encompasses all practical procedures for collecting and
processing private information: manual, automatic, online, and offline.263 How-
ever, it is important to note that the EU Directive is “framework legislation”
and establishes minimum standards each member state shall incorporate to their
privacy-related laws.264 Although the EU Directive sets a floor in some
instances, it does not prohibit deviations among member state privacy laws that
allow higher and stricter standards.265
Each member state is mandated to form an independent Data Protection
Authority (“DPA”) to oversee the collection and appropriate security of per-
sonal data.266 An employer or organization notifies the DPA when they wish to
process data, or they must register with the DPA prior to processing any data,
unless the employer fits within an exemption.267 To register with the DPA, an
employer or organization must provide the following information on “(i) the
purpose of the processing, (ii) the categories of individuals whose data are
being processed and types of related data, (iii) the categories of recipients, (iv)
proposed transfers to third countries, and (v) security measures.”268
The gaps and inconsistencies found in U.S. privacy laws have been mini-
mized in comparable EU laws by the EU Directive’s use of a broad and consist-
ently applied approach to regulating database-driven information systems.269
The EU Directive therefore regulates, but does not prohibit, database-driven
information systems.270 The availability of personal information has become
more readily available over time as commercial trade flows increase and data
258 Nixon Peabody, LLP, supra note 256, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
259 Id.
260 Kline, supra note 12, at 488.
261 Nixon Peabody, LLP, supra note 256, at 2.
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processing technology continues to advance.271 The EU Directive advances the
use of database-driven information systems while balancing individual privacy
rights in personal data.272 The EU Directive protects personal privacy rights by
acknowledging the free-flow of personal data and exercises restrictions over
such flows with rules that improve data accuracy and ensure sensitivity to indi-
vidual data privacy rights in data-processing.273 Compliance with the EU
Directive places modest additional costs on the industry and government.274
The EU Directive successfully maintains a balance in regulation and per-
sonal privacy rights by establishing five basic rule categories.275 Those catego-
ries are: “(1) data accuracy and quality; (2) legitimate data processing practices;
(3) additional protection for sensitive personal data; (4) right to notice for data
subjects; and (5) affirmative individual rights to access, to object, and to seek a
judicial remedy for any breach of applicable Member State privacy laws.”276
The EU Directive further ensures these rules are not avoided through outsourc-
ing or transfer of job operations to third-party countries that fail to ensure
appropriate levels of protection.277 The third-party transfer provision estab-
lished in the EU Directive makes certain global attention and compliance to the
EU Directive guidelines.278
B. The Canadian PIPEDA
Although Canada first enacted private sector privacy laws in the early
1990s, privacy regulation did not make its way into mainstream Canadian cul-
ture until 2000, when the federal government introduced the Personal Informa-
tion Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”).279 PIPEDA is
different in its structure to the EU Directive because many of its operative
provisions are included in a set of relatively general personal information pro-
tection guidelines for businesses, referred to as Schedule I.280 Schedule I incor-
porates ten basic privacy principles, which can be summarized as follows:
accountability, identifying purposes, consent, limiting collection and use, dis-
closure and retention, accuracy, safeguards, openness, individual access, and
challenging compliance.281
PIPEDA applies to an entire organizational group, thus, unlike the United
States’ federal GLBA that allows corporations to exchange PII data between
multiple entities within a corporate group, the PIPEDA maintains no such
exception.282 This principle has most often applied in situations involving orga-
nizations that offer individual customer data to affiliates for marketing pur-
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273 Id. at 489.
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\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\3-1\NVG107.txt unknown Seq: 26  6-JUN-12 10:59
106 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:81
poses.283 PIPEDA requires that “organizations obtain an individual’s consent
when they collect, use, or disclose the individual’s personal information in the
course of commercial activities, and that the personal information be used or
disclosed only for the purposes for which it was collected.”284
Most of the operative portions of PIPEDA attempt to specify when con-
sent is or is not required and how an individual can withdraw their consent.285
An organization that collects personal information has an obligation to safe-
guard and not use or disclose the information to third parties without con-
sent.286 This includes the use or disclosure of personal information for
marketing.287 PIPEDA requires that, at a minimum, the organization must give
notice of such uses to customers and must give them an opportunity to opt out
of receiving marketing materials from those affiliates.288
Under PIPEDA, organizations are required to implement their own pri-
vacy policies and practices.289 Many organizations have concentrated on the
general privacy policy requirements and have failed to develop actual privacy
practices and procedures for the handling of personal information.290 Privacy
issues, generally, will often occur due to a lack of proper privacy practices
rather than a lack of proper privacy policies.291 Some examples of appropriate
privacy procedures that must be implemented are included in the PIPEDA Prin-
ciple 4.1.4.292 The procedures discuss how to receive and respond to com-
plaints and inquiries to train staff, how to effectively communicate information
about the organization’s privacy policies and practices to employees and
agents, and last, how to explain the organization’s policies and procedures to
customers or other third-parties.293
Under PIPEDA, “organizations must employ security safeguards to pro-
tect personal information against loss or theft, as well as unauthorized access,
disclosure, copying, use, or modification.”294 The type of safeguards imposed
will vary depending on the sensitivity, amount, and distribution methods of the
information that has been collected.295 The methods of protection, according to
PIPEDA, should include “physical measures (locked filling cabinets and
restricted access to offices), organizational measures (security clearances and
limiting access on a ‘need-to-know’ basis), and technological measures (pass-
words and encryption).”296
Canada’s PIPEDA and general system of privacy law has served as an
example to other countries in establishing guidelines on data breach notification
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284 Siegel et al., supra note 138, at 296.
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and reporting standards.297 To a significant extent, Canada’s data breach notifi-
cation guidelines have influenced the implementation of similar regulations
adopted in New Zealand and Australia.298 The Canadian PIPEDA should also
serve as a comprehensive data privacy law that the United States can emulate
as a guide in the creation of an omnibus U.S. data privacy law.
C. Benefits of Applying International Privacy Laws in the U.S.
Legal developments in the areas of data protection and privacy are in a
state of flux worldwide. It is imperative that the U.S. eliminates the industry-
based approach and provides a nationwide data privacy statutory framework in
order to provide appropriate protection and relief to consumers in the United
States. Current federal requirements are weak and simply require “reasonable”
measures be taken according to the type of industry. The U.S. maintains no
comprehensive PII data privacy policy and offers no judicial remedy to those
injured by a breach in PII data security. Canadian and European Union privacy
laws require much more advanced and specific measures, including required
customer or employee consent to maintain PII, PII data breach notification,
comprehensive PII data security safeguard standards, and mandatory imple-
mentation of organizational PII data security policies and procedures.
A compelling way to confront the inconsistencies and lack of federal pri-
vacy law in the U.S. is to adopt a comprehensive data privacy law modeled
after the EU Data Directive and Canadian PIPEDA.299 Congress, privacy advo-
cates, and the business sector appear to share a desire to clarify the standard
practices and procedures when it comes to balancing privacy interests with
database-driven information systems.300 Leading technology companies pub-
licly advocate for a comprehensive federal privacy statute.301 In addition, as the
Chief Marketing Officer of ChoicePoint acknowledges, society must make a
decision regarding the use of private information in the marketplace and seri-
ously consider the creation of a better national framework.302 Thus, given the
U.S. Supremacy Clause, federal legislation would provide uniformity to the
multi-state, mixed level of privacy laws currently enacted across the nation.
A comprehensive federal privacy statute would provide a safe harbor pro-
vision, similar to the existing safe harbor agreement allowing U.S. corporate
adherence to the EU Directive. A federal privacy statute can provide the needed
flexibility if compliance would require either extended implementation time or
flexibility in certain industries.303 Implementation of a U.S. data privacy statute
will impose stricter liability standards upon casino, and other business indus-
tries; however, reasonable time will be provided to those entities to allow effec-
tive and efficient conformity to new privacy laws imposed.304
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Large data brokerage companies, credit companies, and other corporate
and government stakeholders argue that an omnibus data privacy statute pro-
viding similar protections to those offered in the EU Directive and the Cana-
dian PIPEDA is unnecessary.305 Their justification relies primarily on three
arguments: “(1) [the] industry can effectively self-regulate and protect individ-
ual privacy interests; (2) the current industry serves important functions that
benefit society; and (3) the freedom with which Americans surrender data sug-
gests little public concern for privacy protections.”306 Further, these anti-data
privacy advocates reason international data privacy regulations such as the
Canadian PIPEDA and EU Directive would shut the database-information
industry down, eliminate jobs, and take value out of the economy.307 However,
these rationales are unfounded and based on fear.
Like most new regulations, new burdens would initially be placed on the
industry; however, many of these costs should already be accounted for by each
organization as part of a well-crafted business model.308 It is vital to maintain
data accuracy and reliability for any organization.309 Identity thieves thrive in
database-driven information markets by searching for and manipulating weak-
nesses in PII database systems.310 Inadequate data management practices today
may lead to significant economic costs that jeopardize our economy in the
future.311 Public opinion must unite and demand stricter privacy legislation and
greater industry regulations as data breaches and instances of identity theft con-
tinue to increase.312 Specifically, proactive measures must be taken by the
industry today to determine the necessary level of safe guards required in the
future as these database systems continue to develop in capability and expand
in size over time.313
The purpose of the EU Directive is the uniformity of data protection laws
across the EU Member States.314 Similarly, the purpose of the Canadian
PIPEDA is to apply minimal data privacy standards across all Canadian prov-
inces to achieve consistency and equivalence. These approaches are in direct
contrast with the U.S., which has taken an industry-based approach, relying on
industry specific legislation, government regulation, and self-regulation by cor-
porate entities.315 The potential benefits to the U.S. in adopting the EU and
Canadian omnibus data privacy regulatory approach include: (1) a uniform data
privacy standard applicable to all private, public, commercial sectors (including
the gaming industry); (2) the improvement of database-driven information sys-
tems through clearly defined guidelines to data privacy; (3) effective leverage
of individual data subjects to address database accuracy; and (4) enhanced indi-
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vidual awareness of privacy interests and expectations.316 The EU Data Direc-
tive and Canadian PIPEDA address imperfections in the database-driven
information markets worldwide and are models for improving database-driven
information systems in the United States.317
Thus, the EU Data Directive and Canadian PIPEDA offer practical pri-
vacy frameworks because they provide workable definitions of database-driven
activities and ensure affirmative rights for an individual’s right to privacy.318 A
U.S. data privacy statute would provide comprehensive protection for individu-
als by establishing across-the-board regulatory expectations for the federal gov-
ernment, states, corporations, and individuals.319 The implementation of such a
statute would also address the various weaknesses and inconsistencies that cur-
rently exist in federal and state data privacy laws.320
A U.S. data privacy statute would protect individuals against the weak
Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and expand privacy
protections to the private sector.321 Courts would benefit from a U.S. data pri-
vacy statute that moves away from the out-dated theories regarding the right to
privacy, and establishing a statutory scheme that clearly expresses a data pro-
tection standard.322 An omnibus statutory standard would comprehensively reg-
ulate the large database-driven information systems with efficiency, consistent
guidance, and maximum coverage, without imposing too harsh a burden on the
aggregators of information.323
CONCLUSION
The U.S. should embrace a properly adapted version of the EU Directive
and Canadian PIPEDA because increased utilization of database-driven infor-
mation systems in the casino industry requires new legislation to improve the
organizational security of personal data. A uniform, nationwide privacy policy
will not only benefit the casino industry, but all commercial, government, and
group enterprises that utilize information markets. A comprehensive U.S. pri-
vacy statute would address harmful imperfections in our privacy laws, recog-
nize an affirmative right to data privacy, and revive an expectation of privacy
within individuals; an expectation currently weakened by the actions of both
the Supreme Court and Congress.
A comprehensive U.S. data privacy statute is the best way to restore indi-
vidual privacy rights and bolster the long-term viability of database-driven
information systems in the casino industry and in all U.S. business commerce.
The statute should include improved data accuracy requirements, notice and
consent requirements, and appropriate measures to transfer the risk back to the
entities responsible for casino database system control in order to better deal
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with data theft and misuse. These provisions will ensure viable and robust
database-driven information systems for the future, ultimately benefiting the
data brokerage industry, the government, and corporate interests (including
casino corporations), and promote greater individual participation in database-
driven PII systems.
